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I thank Sherry Colb and Peter Swire for devoting their time and 
considerable talents to responding to my article, The Fourth 
Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the Case 
for Caution. I will conclude with a few comments. 
I. REPLY TO PROFESSOR COLB 
I very much enjoyed reading Professor Colb's response, although I 
think at times it misunderstands my article. To clarify, my article does 
not present a defense of the physical-trespass test in Fourth 
Amendment law; it does not answer how the Fourth Amendment 
should apply to a hypothetical brain-wave recorder; it does not argue 
that the use of property principles is proper in light of originalist or 
other theories of constitutional interpretation; and it does not claim 
that there should be no role for the Fourth Amendment in cases that 
involve developing technologies.1 My article does not endorse any 
particular Fourth Amendment test, and has nothing positive to say 
about the pre-Jones physical-trespass approach. I do note that 
property concepts appear with surprising regularity when judges 
* Associate Professor of Law, George Washington University Law School. B.S.E. 1993, 
Princeton University; M.S. 1994, Stanford University; J.D. 1997, Harvard Law School. - Ed. 
I thank the editors of the Michigan Law Review for giving me the opportunity to reply. 
1. But see Sherry F. Colb, A World Without Privacy: Why Property Does Not Define the 
Limits of the Right Against Unreasonable Searches and Seizures, 102 MICH. L. REV. 888, 890 
(2004) ("The appropriate question is whether courts have (and whether they ought to have) 
an obligation to apply the Fourth Amendment to new technologies that could invade privacy 
without physically trespassing on anyone's private property. Kerr answers this question 
no . . . .  "); id. at 888-89 (arguing that my analysis would find no constitutional limitations on 
the use of a hypothetical "brain wave recorder"); id. at 893-94 (arguing that an originalist 
should interpret the Fourth Amendment as protecting privacy instead of property); id. at 901 
(describing my normative position as " Kerr's argument that Congress alone should be 
entrusted with protecting privacy"). 
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interpret the Fourth Amendment. Even when purporting to protect 
privacy, judges have proven reluctant to deviate from rules based on 
principles of property law. I make this argument not to endorse 
property law as a specific normative principle of interpretation, but 
rather to show how courts have interpreted the post-Katz Fourth 
Amendment in a narrow way with important ramifications for the 
Fourth Amendment in new technologies. We can debate why this is 
so: my own suspicion is that judges understand property concepts, but 
have no common framework for assessing and evaluating privacy 
claims.2 Whatever the reason, I have no necessary sympathy for the 
property approach. I argue that judicial modesty has important virtues 
in this area, but such modesty can be achieved under a privacy 
approach as well.3 
More broadly, my article presents a pragmatic case for judicial 
caution in the face of rapid technological change, not a defense of 
property law as a guide for interpreting the Fourth Amendment. It 
attempts to bring about a greater awareness of the role of statutory 
privacy laws and the gap between the perception and reality of where 
privacy rights governing new technologies originate. While scholars 
focus on the Constitution, the primary privacy protections regulating 
new technologies have come from Congress. To be sure, this may be 
the kind of technical and arcane issue that only a law professor could 
find interesting; as Professor Colb notes, most people care about 
whether their privacy is protected, not what branch of government 
confers that protection.4 But for readers concerned with the structure 
and contour of privacy laws, I offer a pragmatist case for why we 
should focus more on statutory protections and less on developing 
theories of constitutional protection. Fourth Amendment history, 
doctrine, and the institutional limitations of the courts suggest that the 
2. Nor do privacy law scholars, for that matter. A rather large percentage of scholarship 
in the area of privacy law is focused on trying to determine the meaning of privacy. See, e.g., 
Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1087 (2002) (reviewing the 
many different understandings of privacy and offering another understanding of what 
privacy means). 
3. Peter Swire's article provides a helpful reminder that a privacy-focused regime does 
not necessarily lead to a more protective Fourth Amendment regime than a property­
focused regime. See Peter P. Swire, Katz is Dead. Long Live Katz., MICH. L. REV. 904, 910 
(2004) (arguing that "courts have clung to the property approach to assist the government" 
and elsewhere has used "[t]he end of the property regime . . .  [as] a sword for the 
government, not a shield of personal privacy"); see also Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth 
Amendment in Cyberspace: Can Encryption Create a 'Reasonable Expectation of Privacy?', 
33 CONN. L. REV. 503, 512-13 (2001) (noting that rights-based conceptions of the Fourth 
Amendment can lead to broader protections than privacy-based conceptions of the Fourth 
Amendment). I mostly disagree with the examples Swire relies upon - in particular, I see 
third-party conveyance cases such as United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976), as property 
cases - but the key point survives that it is possible to have a low-protection privacy regime. 
4. See Colb, supra note 1, at 890. 
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vital work of protecting privacy in response to technological change 
will come more from Congress than from the courts. 
Colb makes two interesting practical arguments against judicial 
caution. First, she suggests that judicial deference is unnecessary 
because even broad judicial privacy protection would not overprotect 
privacy interests.5 I understand Colb's argument as one of substantive 
preference: Colb greatly values privacy, and she calculates that within 
the set of feasible outcomes more privacy will always be better. 
Because the courts are unlikely to interpret the Fourth Amendment in 
a way that provides more privacy than Colb would want, there is no 
harm if the courts interpret the Fourth Amendment broadly.6 In my 
view, the problem with this argument is that it overlooks the 
difficulties judges face when they craft privacy rules regulating 
developing technologies. Colb may be right that most judges will not 
intentionally create rules that are more privacy protecting than she 
would want. But attempts to protect privacy can backfire, and the 
context of judicial rulemaking makes missteps particularly likely. As a 
result, judicially crafted rules are particularly likely to have 
unintended consequences that even a privacy-valuing observer would 
dislike. Consider Judge Magnuson's holding in United States v. Bach1 
that the Fourth Ame-ndment requires a law-enforcement officer be 
physically present whenever an internet service provider ("ISP") 
responds to a search warrant for information on its servers.8 Judge 
Magnuson believed that his rule would protect privacy, but his failure 
to understand the relevant technology created a mismatch between his 
values and the effect of the resulting rule. If the Eighth Circuit had not 
overturned his decision, Magnuson's rule either would have slowed 
investigations considerably without any benefit to privacy or else 
required police officers to be stationed permanently at ISPs. It is hard 
to see how either outcome would achieve the goal of protecting 
privacy. 
Colb also argues that Congress may be unable to protect privacy 
adequately because it may lack the constitutional authority to do so.9 I 
think her concern is overstated. Colb's analysis overlooks the 
expansive reach of the modern Commerce Clause, which provides 
broad authority to regulate the use of developing technologies. The 
Supreme Court has interpreted the Commerce Clause to give 
Congress essentially unlimited power over instruments of interstate 
5. See Colb, supra note 1, at 900. 
6. Id. 
7. No. Crim.01-221, 2001WL 1690055 ( D. Minn. Dec. 14, 2001). 
8. See id. at * 3. 
9. Colb, supra note 1, at 900-01. 
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commerce such as communications networks.10 As a practical matter, 
this means that Congress can regulate anything connected to the 
Intemet.11 In addition, lower courts for the most part have allowed 
Congress to regulate the use of technological instruments that have 
traveled in interstate commerce prior to their use.12 For example, use 
of a camera to create images of child pornography can be regulated by 
Congress if the camera or film has traveled in interstate or 
international commerce.13 This theory permits Congress to regulate 
the use of nearly every camera and all film. If upheld by the Supreme 
Court, it would allow Congress to regulate the use of new technologies 
by state and local governments without any significant limits. Because 
nearly every technological tool travels across state lines prior to its 
use, it seems likely based on existing law that Congress can regulate 
technological instruments under the Commerce Clause. 
II. REPLY TO PROFESSOR SWIRE 
Professor Swire's thoughtful article offers a series of arguments in 
support of a strong role for the courts in the protection of privacy 
involving developing technologies. Swire's first argument is that 
constitutional privacy protections are necessary because they tend to 
be stronger than statutory protections. According to Swire, statutory 
10. Weiss v. United States, 308 U.S. 321 (1939). 
11. See, e.g., United States v. Runyan, 290 F.3d 223 (5th Cir. 2002) (finding interstate­
commerce element in child-pornography statutes was established when Government linked 
images to the Internet); United States v. Carroll, 105 F.3d 740, 742 (1st Cir. 1997) (stating 
that "[t]ransmission of photographs by means of the Internet is tantamount to moving 
photographs across state lines and thus constitutes transportation in interstate commerce"); 
United States v. Thomas, 74 F.3d 701, 706-09 (6th Cir. 1996) (finding interstate-commerce 
element in obscenity statutes was satisfied where pornographic material sent via the 
Internet); United States v. Kelly, No. 99-10100-01, 2000 WL 433093, at *2 (D. Kan. Mar. 2, 
2000) ("Assuming, as defendant contends, that the facility and means used in this case was a 
computer with a modem connected via phone lines to the internet, the court concludes that 
this would clearly be a sufficient nexus to interstate commerce to permit Congress to 
regulate it."). 
12. See, e.g . ,  United States v. Rodia, 194 F.3d 465 (3d Cir. 1999) (upholding 18 U.S.C. § 
2252(a) (4)(B) under the Commerce Clause). 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a) (4) (B) (2000) makes it a 
felony crime to 
knowingly possess[] 1 or more books, magazines, periodicals, films, video tapes, or other 
matter which contain any visual depiction that has been mailed, or has been shipped or 
transported in interstate or foreign commerce, or which was produced using materials which 
have been mailed or so shipped or transported, by any means including by computer, if -
(i) the producing of such visual depiction involves the use of a minor engaging in sexually 
explicit conduct; and 
(ii) such visual depiction is of such conduct .... 
Id. (emphasis added). 
13. See Rodia, 194 F.3d at 479 (upholding the statute under the Commerce Clause). But 
see United States v. McCoy, 323 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (rejecting this theory). 
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privacy protections are weak and constantly shrinking because the 
Justice Department controls the legislative process.14 In contrast, 
constitutional protections once established remain stable and strong.15 
As a descriptive matter, however, I am not convinced that this is true. 
It seems to me that both statutory and constitutional privacy 
protections on average tend toward a middle ground. Supreme Court 
decisions establishing strong Fourth Amendment protection tend to 
be followed by other decisions that temper the initial rule. For 
example, the Supreme Court's expansion of the exclusionary rule to 
the States in Mapp v. Ohio16 was followed by a series of decisions 
minimizing the scope of exclusion, both through good-faith exceptions 
for warrants17 and new exceptions to the warrant requirement.18 
Perhaps Katz itself is an example: the promise of broad protection in 
Katz was followed by a series of cases construing it narrowly. Through 
repeated case-by-case decisions, the courts eventually work their way 
toward some sort of middle ground level of protection. 
Contrary to Swire's suggestion, I think that statutory protections 
also tend to reach a middle ground. If there is a general trend toward 
lesser statutory protection over time, it is not clear to me. Swire 
focuses on the fact that Congress did not act on an Internet privacy bill 
that the House Judiciary Committee approved in 2000, but then 
passed the USA Patriot Act in 2001. To Swire, this suggests that the 
legislative process is broken: Congress passed (bad) pro-government 
legislation but not (good) pro-privacy legislation, leading to less 
privacy.19 I find it difficult to draw a lesson from this example. It is 
worth noting, however, that in Swire's own example the legislative 
process rejected FBI and DOJ proposals and instead attempted to 
push the law in a strongly pro-privacy direction. Then, when Congress 
passed some of the proposals a few years later, it did so only under 
remarkable circumstances and even then only subject to a sunset 
provision.20 If Swire's example is supposed to show a trend toward 
14. Swire, supra note 3, at 919-20. 
15. Id. at 916 ("Fourth Amendment cases generally offer a sharp yes/no choice between 
two positions. If the government action is a 'search,' then there are relatively strict rules. A 
neutral magistrate must decide whether 'probable cause' has been shown."). 
16. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
17. See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). 
18. See, e.g., United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 809 (1982). 
19. See Swire supra note 3, at 914-15. 
20. The pro-privacy bill that Swire mentions is House Bill 5018, the Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act of 2000, which began as a Clinton administration initiative to 
update the Internet privacy laws. At that time, the House Judiciary Committee was 
controlled by Republican Bob Barr. The House Judiciary Committee under Barr 
transformed the bill. As Swire acknowledges, the committee "overwhelmingly amended [the 
proposal] in the direction of greater privacy protections." See Swire supra note 3, at 915. 
Indeed, the bill that emerged would have shifted the rules rather dramatically in a pro-
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lessening privacy protection over time, then it is at best a mixed signal. 
More broadly, the privacy/security pendulum swings both ways; while 
there may be times of crisis when the pendulum swings in favor of law 
enforcement, there are other periods when the pendulum swings in 
favor of privacy. I would pose this question to Swire: if there is a 
systematic tendency toward greater surveillance, in what year was 
privacy most protected by the legislative process? In 1960, when 
federal law did not forbid wiretapping? In 1970, before PISA was 
enacted? In 1980, before Congress passed ECPA? 
More broadly, comparing privacy protections at different times is 
more difficult than Swire acknowledges. Law, technology, and social 
practices interact in complicated ways, and changes in law often 
respond to changes in technology and social practice. Whether you 
identify a trend in one direction or another depends in part on 
whether you look primarily to law in isolation or to the interaction of 
law with social practice and technology. When emerging technologies 
make surveillance easier and new legal protections are proposed to 
counter them, those concerned with privacy can look to technology 
and social practice and identify a decrease in privacy protections. At 
the same time, those concerned with public safety can look at the law 
in isolation and argue that the proposed amendments would impose 
greater restrictions than ever before.21 The strategies flip when 
technology makes surveillance harder, and the issue turns to whether 
the law should change to restore some lost powers. Law enforcement 
advocates will tend to look at technology and social practice and see a 
threat to effective investigations, while privacy advocates will tend to 
focus on the law in isolation and argue that the proposed amendment 
would give the government unprecedented new authority.22 This does 
not mean it is impossible to make overall measurements of how much 
privacy direction by raising privacy thresholds and imposing suppression remedies in nearly 
every context of communications-network crime investigations. For example, the law would 
have imposed a statutory suppression remedy for intercepted Internet communications, see 
H.R. 5018, 106th Cong. § 2 (a)- (b) (2000), raised the threshold for obtaining pen register 
orders, see H.R. 5018 § 4, imposed a warrant requirement on cell phone location 
information, see H.R. 5018 § 7, and extended the warrant requirement from only unopened 
email to protect all email, see H.R. 5018 § 13. This change in direction scuttled the bill: 
privacy advocates were skeptical because the bill contained some pro-government measures 
and had been supported by the Clinton Administration, and law-enforcement interests 
opposed the bill because on the whole it represented a substantial shift toward greater 
regulation of law enforcement. 
21. Consider Swire's discussion of how the law should respond to changes in technology 
as telephone communications are routed over the Internet. Here he focuses on how 
advancing technology lessens privacy under the assumption of stable legal rules. See Swire, 
supra note 3, at 910-15. 
22. We have seen this debate in the context of debates over the use of encryption and 
the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act of 1994 (" CALEA"), codified at 
47 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1021 (2000). See Dan Eggen & Jonathan Krim, Easier Internet Wiretaps 
Sought, N.Y. TIMES March 13, 2004, at Al. 
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privacy the law provides at different times. But it does mean that 
effective comparisons across time are difficult to make. 
Swire suggests that statutory protections tend to be weak because 
the Justice Department controls the legislative process, but fails to 
identify a persuasive reason why legislators should listen to law­
enforcement interests beyond the legislators' interest in satisfying 
public preferences.23 Swire draws on the insight that concentrated 
groups can influence legislation more than dispersed groups,24 but his 
concern is addressed by the existence of the influential privacy groups 
that represent privacy interests in legislative debates in Congress. 
Groups such as the American Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU"), the 
Center for Democracy and Technology, and the Electronic Privacy 
Information Center have considerable sway on Capitol Hill. 
Mainstream press outlets such as the New York Times and the 
Washington Post provide extensive coverage of surveillance and 
privacy issues that on the whole tends to be wary of government 
claims and sympathetic to privacy concerns.25 As I have noted 
elsewhere, law-enforcement groups and privacy groups are the "two 
important constituencies that exert a significant influence over 
Congress in this area."26 As a practical matter, "few changes in 
[privacy statutes involving new technologies] can pass through 
Congress without at least the support of one of these sides and the 
grudging acquiescence of the other."27 
I don't wish to paint an overly rosy picture of Congress and the 
legislative process. At the federal level, the constitutional structure 
gives law-enforcement agencies an important advantage in 
congressional negotiations in the form of the presidential veto power.28 
Law-enforcement powers are executive-branch powers, and most 
presidents will be more willing to expand executive-branch powers 
23. As Williams Stuntz has argued in the context of substantive criminal law, legislators 
have legitimate reasons to pay attention to Jaw-enforcement interests: 
That natural alliance (of interest between legislators and law-enforcement groups) should 
make prosecutors (along with police) a very powerful lobby on criminal law issues. If police 
and prosecutors want some new criminal prohibition, they likely want it because it would 
advance their goals. Advancing police and prosecutors' goals usually means advancing 
legislators' goals as well. Thus, legislators have good reason to listen when prosecutors urge 
some statutory change. 
Willam J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 534 
(2001). 
24. Cf MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1971). 
25. See, e.g., Orin S. Kerr, Internet Surveillance Law After the USA Patriot Act: The Big 
Brother That Isn't, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 607 (2003). 
26. Orin S. Kerr, Lifting the 'Fog' of Internet Surveillance: How A Suppression Remedy 
Would Change Computer Crime Law, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 805, 837 (2003). 
27. Id. 
28. See U .S . CONST. art I,§ 7. 
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than reduce them. This dynamic allows· presidents to use threats 
of vetoes (and in unusual cases, vetoes themselves) as tools to 
block legislative enactments that law enforcement interests view as 
threatening. If, over time, the veto threat creates an institutional bias 
in legislation in favor of law-enforcement interests, that may create an 
important role for the judiciary to play. In effect, the judicial branch 
could act as a counter to the executive branch; while a President could 
use the veto power to nullify legislation that excessively narrows 
executive power, the courts could use their power of judicial review to 
nullify legislation that excessively broadens it. 
One interesting way in which the courts might respond to this 
dynamic is through statutory rather than constitutional interpretation. 
When interpreting statutory text, judges could place a 'thumb on the 
scale' in favor of privacy interests. The combination of judicial caution 
in the constitutional area and judicial boldness in the statutory area 
might lead to an optimal solution. Courts could further Fourth 
Amendment values by protecting privacy through statutory 
construction. Judicial pressure in statutory cases would keep Congress 
on its toes, encouraging Congress to enact clear and carefully 
articulated statutory standards. At the same time, the courts would 
rest final authority for the scope of privacy protection (within some 
constitutional bound) with the governmental body best suited to craft 
privacy protections in new technologies - the legislature. 
There is a history supporting just such an approach. Consider the 
Supreme Court's pro-privacy reading of the first permanent federal 
wiretapping statute, Section 605 of the Communications Act of 1934.29 
As a textual matter, Section 605 appears to be only a criminal 
prohibition on private wiretapping; it says nothing about wiretapping 
by government agents or remedies beyond criminal punishment. In 
1937, however, the Court interpreted the law in Nardone v. United 
States3° to apply to federal officers and also to serve an evidentiary 
function: according to the Court, the statute made all wiretapping 
evidence inadmissible in federal court.31 The Court relied in part on 
policy considerations: 
For years controversy has raged with respect to the morality of the 
practice of wire-tapping by officers to obtain evidence. It has been the 
view of many that the practice involves a grave wrong. In the light of 
these circumstances we think another well recognized principle leads to 
the application of the statute as it is written so as to include within its 
sweep federal officers as well as others.32 
29. 47 u.s.c. § 605 (2000). 
30. 302 U.S. 379 (1937). 
31. Id. at 384. 
32. Id. 
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Three years later, the Court expanded that holding in the second 
Nardone v. United States33 to require the exclusion of "fruit of the 
poisonous tree" of illegal wiretapping.34 The Court relied explicitly on 
the need to protect privacy: "two opposing concerns must be 
harmonized: on the one hand, the stem enforcement of the criminal 
law; on the other, protection of that realm of privacy left free by 
Constitution and laws but capable of infringement either through zeal 
or design."35 Just a decade after the Court declined to regulate 
wiretapping under the Fourth Amendment in Olmstead, it opted for 
aggressive pro-privacy readings of the statutory wiretapping law in the 
Nardone cases. 
Other courts have suggested that statutory privacy laws should be 
construed broadly. Consider a few excerpts from decided cases on the 
various federal statutory privacy laws. On the Privacy Act: "[T]he 
Privacy Act's protection is to be broadly construed. "36 On the Wiretap 
Act: "When considering a statute designed to protect privacy, a court 
must be reluctant to give expansive reading to the exceptions."37 On 
the Electronic Communications Privacy Act: "In these days of 'big 
brother,' where through technology and otherwise the privacy 
interests of individuals from all walks of life are being ignored or 
marginalized, it is imperative that statutes explicitly protecting these 
rights be strictly observed."38 Such examples may not in isolation 
amount to an existing canon in favor of construing privacy statutes 
broadly. At the same time, such a canon may permit judges to pursue 
constitutional values without the institutional difficulties of a judge­
based privacy regime when technology is in flux. 
I am less persuaded by some of the other arguments that Professor 
Swire makes. For example, Swire argues that the courts should 
interpret the Fourth Amendment expansively because a strong Fourth 
Amendment will facilitate the public debate over statutory privacy 
laws. While congressional debates may sometimes be inspired by 
constitutional discourse, I doubt that this inspiration hinges on the 
actual scope of the privacy protection the courts establish or the 
precise tests that they endorse. After all, Brandeis and Warren's "right 
to be let alone" is justly celebrated and oft-cited in legislative debates 
33. 308 U.S. 338, 34 1 ( 1939). 
34. Id. at 341. This case introduced the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine later 
adopted in the Fourth Amendment context: "[T]he trial judge must give opportunity, 
however closely confined, to the accused to prove that a substantial portion of the case 
against him was a fruit of the poisonous tree." Id. 
35. Id. at 340. 
36. Martin v. United States, 1 Cl. Ct. 775, 780 ( Fed. Cl. 1983). 
37. Jandak v. Village of Brookfield, 520 F. Supp. 815, 820 (N.D. Ill. 1981). 
38. McVeigh v. Cohen, 983 F. Supp. 2 15, 220 (D.D.C. 1998). 
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in favor of increased privacy protections, but no one seems to 
remember or care that the Supreme Court rejected this approach in 
Katz v. United States. 39 
Similarly, Swire agrees that decisions rejecting Fourth Amendment 
protection have inspired congressional action in the past, but argues 
that this is unlikley to occur again in the future.40 According to Swire, 
"[t]he triumph of the jurisprudence of United States v. Miller and 
Smith v. Maryland suggests little room for new decisions by the 
Supreme Court that would prompt congressional action."41 I disagree. 
Smith and Miller are hotly contested cases, and even when read 
broadly they concern only the narrow question of whether third-party 
possession eliminates Fourth Amendment protection. There are good 
reasons not to read these cases broadly, among them the recent 
decision in Kyllo.42 Given this, I think it likely that lower courts will 
divide on how the Fourth Amendment applies to emerging 
technologies ranging from computer files to cell phone 
communications, and that the Supreme Court will eventually address 
at least some of them. Supreme Court decisions involving any of these 
technologies will trigger vigorous legislative activity. 
Swire is also too quick to dismiss the judiciary's lack of expertise. 
According to Swire, judges can overcome their institutional difficulties 
through the use of expert testimony, review of opinion polls, and a 
close study of relevant statutory privacy laws.43 None are likely to be 
helpful. To the extent that Swire imagines judges trying to identify and 
match constitutional protections to majoritarian preferences, it is 
unclear why we cannot leave such matters to the elected branches. 
Expert testimony is unlikely to help much because most Fourth 
Amendment questions arise in the context of a motion to suppress, 
rather than a civil trial between well-financed adversaries. Defense 
attorneys will only rarely find it worthwhile to educate a judge about a 
technology, and judges will only rarely think that they need to be so 
educated. Finally, many of the relevant questions are beyond even an 
expert's knowledge. Such questions include: How will the use of a 
given technology evolve over time? What would be the consequences 
of a particular rule? These are not the types of questions that technical 
experts are well equipped to answer. 
39. 389 U.S. 347, 350-51 ( 1967). 
40. Swire, supra note 3, at 917. 
4 1. Id. (citations omitted). 
42. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001); see, e.g . ,  Brief of Amicus Curiae Orin S. 
Kerr, United States v. Bach, 310 F.3d 1063 (8th Cir. 2002) (No. 02- 1238), at http://www.epic. 
org/privacy/bach/kerr_amicus.pdf (exploring precedents in support of both high Fourth 
Amendment protection and low Fourth Amendment protection for stored email held by an 
Internet service provider). 
43. See S wire, supra note 3, at 924. 
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CONCLUSION 
In my article, I predict that we may be moving toward a bifurcated 
regime in which privacy rights in traditional cases are constitutional 
but rights in developing technologies are largely statutory. This is an 
easy prediction to make in some ways, for it is a fairly accurate 
description of the law today. Professors Swire and Colb each want the 
courts to reinvigorate the Fourth Amendment, and argue that the 
courts must and can assume a vigorous role regulating the use of 
emerging technologies. Whether the courts follow a bold or more 
modest path, I hope both Colb and Swire will agree that in the 
foreseeable future Congress will continue to play an essential role. 
Whatever balance is struck between constitutional and statutory 
privacy, we should recognize that statutory laws should not remain an 
afterthought. If scholars wish to remain relevant to the law in action, 
we should focus on Congress and appreciate the possibilities of 
statutory law as a source of privacy protection in new technologies. 
